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Description of the Collateral under Revised Article 9
Cynthia Grant*
I. SUMMARY
By the end of 2001, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had
adopted the 1998 revision of Article 9 of The Uniform Commercial
Code. In the three years since the revision became effective, it has sub-
stantially changed the law and practice of secured transactions. The
question is--in which way and how much?
This article examines one change: the requirements for the descrip-
tion of the collateral. The revision does not change the requirements for
the description in a security agreement, but Revised 9-502 allows a se-
cured party to use the supergeneric "all assets of the debtor" in a financ-
ing statement. Complicating this change is the removal of former UCC
9-109, which described the four different types of "goods." Instead, the
definitions of different types of collateral are scattered throughout the
revision, sometimes amending the old definitions. Have these changes
resulted in case law different from the cases that arose in the last years
of former Article 9?
To seek an answer to these questions, this article looks at cases de-
cided between 1984 and 2004, dividing cases among the "types" of col-
lateral and determining if the description of the collateral in the security
agreement and/or financing statement was sufficient. Within each group
of cases concerning a given "type" of collateral, the article separates
cases decided under former Article 9 from those decided under Revised
Article 9. It concludes that the handful of cases decided under the revi-
sion show no significant change from the cases decided in the 15-20
years before the revision. However, because no case determining the
significance of the "all assets of the debtor" description has arisen, the
effect of this change has yet to be realized.
II. INTRODUCTION
Since 2001, courts throughout the United States have had the task
of applying the changes made to the Uniform Commercial Code to
case law. The drafters of Revised Article 9 intended to simplify fi-
* The author would like to thank Ann Lousin for her guidance and wise counsel.
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nancing transactions while bringing certainty to issues that plagued
the courts under former Article 9.' By clarifying the scope of Article
9 and by spelling out the procedures necessary to consummate a se-
cured transaction, the hope of the drafters was to make these transac-
tions less costly and more "user friendly."' 2 The extent to which this
has been accomplished has yet to be determined since it has been only
four years since the majority of states have passed Revised Article 9.
Several changes to Article 9 were merely formalities. Definitions
became more clearly established and the limitations of sections were
chiseled in statute. However, one of the more interesting, but puz-
zling, changes made to Article 9 involved the description of the collat-
eral. Under former 9-109 a creditor was to describe the collateral of
the debtor in its financing statement under the categories set forth by
the Code: goods (consumer goods, equipment, farm products and in-
ventory), accounts, general intangibles, real estate, and instruments. 3
These categories gave creditors a road map to follow when drafting
security agreements and financing statements. However, under Re-
vised Article 9, these categories of collateral were completely re-
moved. Instead of having a section which describes these types of
collateral, they have merely become definitions of Revised 9-102.
Revised 9-108 replaced former 9-110. Under Revised 9-108, it is in-
sufficient to use "supergeneric" descriptions of the collateral such as
"all assets of the debtor" or "all personal property of the debtor."' 4
1. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2005).
2. See id. § 9-101 cmt. 4.
3. U.C.C. § 9-109 (2000) (amended 2001). This provision is titled "Classification of Goods:
'Consumer Goods'; 'Equipment'; 'Farm Products'; 'Inventory"' and states that goods are:
(1) "consumer goods" if they are used or bought for primarily for personal, family or
household purposes;
(2) "equipment" if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (including
farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or governmen-
tal subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definition of inventory,
farm products or consumer goods;
(3) "farm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in
farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured
states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and eggs), and if they are in
the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing or other farming opera-
tions. If goods are farm products they are neither equipment nor inventory;
(4) "inventory" if they are held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to be
furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw
materials, work in process or materials used or consumed in a business. Inventory of a
person is not to be classified as his equipment.
Id.
4. U.C.C. § 9-108 (2005). This provision is titled Sufficiency of Description" and states:
(a) Sufficiency of description. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c), (d),
and (e), a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is
specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.
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However, under Revised 9-504 a description in a financing statement
will be sufficient if it covers "all assets or all personal property" of the
debtor.5 Revised Article 9 allows for a more lenient description of the
collateral for a financing statement but still requires a "reasonable
(b) Examples of reasonable identification. Except as otherwise provided in subsec-




(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a type of collateral defined in
[the Uniform Commercial Code];
(4) quantity;
(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any other method, if the iden-
tity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
(c) Supergeneric description not sufficient. A description of collateral as "all the
debtor's assets" or "all the debtor's personal property" or using words of similar import
does not reasonably identify the collateral.
(d) Investment property. Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(e), a description of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account
is sufficient if it describes:
(1) the collateral by those terms or as investment property; or
(2) the underlying financial asset or commodity contract.
(e) When description by type insufficient. A description only by type of collateral
defined in [the Uniform Commercial Code] is an insufficient description of:
(1) a commercial tort claim; or
(2) in a consumer transaction, consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities
account, or a commodity account.
Id.
5. U.C.C. § 9-502 (2005). This provision is titled "Contents of Financing Statement; Record of
Mortgage as Financing Statement; Time of Filing Financing Statement." and states:
(a) Sufficiency of financing statement. Subject to subsection (b), a financing state-
ment is sufficient only if it:
(1) provides the name of the debtor;
(2) provides the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured
party; and
(3) indicates the collateral covered by the financing statement.
(b) Real-property-related financing statements. Except as otherwise provided in
Section 9-501(b), to be sufficient, a financing statement that covers as-extracted collat-
eral or timber to be cut, or which is filed as a fixture filing and covers goods that are or
are to become fixtures, must satisfy subsection (a) and also:
(1) indicate that it covers this type of collateral;
(2) indicate that it is to be filed [for record] in the real property records;
(3) provide a description of the real property to which the collateral is related
[sufficient to give constructive notice of a mortgage under the law of this State if the
description were contained in a record of the mortgage of the real property]; and
(4) if the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real property, provide
the name of a record owner.
(c) Record of mortgage as financing statement. A record of a mortgage is effective,
from the date of recording, as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or as a
financing statement covering as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut only if:
(1) the record indicates the goods or accounts that it covers;
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description" of the collateral in a security agreement. This is because
the purpose of a financing statement is to give subsequent creditors
notice that a security interest may be present in some property of the
debtor and to allow those creditors to conduct an inquiry as to the
extent of the security.6 The question after the passage of Revised Ar-
ticle 9 was whether drafters of security agreements and financing
statements would still use the categories of collateral as was required
under former 9-109 when describing the security interest.
The purpose of this article is to analyze the impact of the different
sections of Revised Article 9, including 9-102, 9-109, and 9-504, which,
combined, replace and supersede the scope of former 9-109. This arti-
cle will look at cases under former Article 9 as well as the new Article
9 and the court decisions of those cases; specifically, decisions involv-
ing the sufficiency of the description of the collateral. Under Revised
Article 9 a financing statement that describes the collateral as "all the
assets of the debtor" would satisfy the new requirements whereas
under former Article 9 this would not be sufficient. 7 One inquiry of
this article is whether drafters have stopped using the categories of
collateral as a result. By looking at the recent decisions of the courts
as to the sufficiency of the description of the collateral, new light can
be shed on the interpretation of the new description requirements of
Revised Article 9.
First this article will separate cases under the former Article 9 from
cases under the Revised Article 9. The analysis begins with cases de-
cided beginning in 1984 and continuing through the present, all of
which were decided under former Article 9. Cases under former Arti-
cle 9 will be further separated under the collateral categories of goods,
general intangibles, accounts and real estate.
The first set of cases under the former Article 9 are those that fall
under the category of "goods" as described in former 9-109: inven-
(2) the goods are or are to become fixtures related to the real property described
in the record or the collateral is related to the real property described in the record and
is as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut;
(3) the record satisfied the requirements for a financing statement in this section
other than an indication that it is to be filed in the real property records; and
(4) the record is [duly] recorded.
(d) Filing before security agreement or attachment. A financing statement may be
filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches.
Id.
6. See U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (2005).
7. Id. § 9-504 (2005). Section 9-504 discussing collateral states, "A financing statement suffi-
ciently indicates the collateral that it covers if the financing statement provides: (1) a description
of the collateral pursuant to Section 9-108; or (2)an indication that the financing statement cov-
ers all assets or all personal property." Id.
[Vol. 4:235
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tory, farm products, equipment and consumer goods. The analysis of
these cases will show that the courts were diligent in requiring drafters
of security instruments to adhere to the categories of collateral as put
forth under the former Article 9.
III. CONSUMER GOODS
Under the former Article 9 "goods" fell under four sub-categories:
consumer goods, inventory, equipment and farm products.8 Former 9-
109 defined "consumer goods" as an item that is "used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." 9 In re Ber-
ansen involved the use of consumer goods as a security interest.10 The
debtors financed the purchase of a home water treatment system and
signed a security agreement "giving a security interest in the goods or
property being purchased."' 1 In the security agreement the serial
numbers of the parts were listed but the description of the water treat-
ment system or its components was not given.12 The court determined
that the description of the collateral using serial numbers could make
identification possible but it was not practical for subsequent credi-
tors. 13 The court held that the use of mere serial numbers in the se-
curity agreement was too broad because, in order to identify the water
treatment system, a subsequent creditor would have to look at every
consumer good in the house and check the serial number on it in or-
der to ascertain if that item was part of the creditor's security inter-
est.14 A serial number standing alone without further identification
will not be found to be a sufficient description, especially in connec-
tion with consumer goods. There could be hundreds of household
items which have serial numbers attached to them but if there is no
other identifier a subsequent creditor would have no notice of a secur-
ity interest of another creditor.
Connected to the idea that consumer goods need more than just a
serial number to describe the collateral is the circumstance where a
consumer may have more than one of the item which is encumbered
by a security interest in their home. A more descriptive security
agreement or financing statement using the categories of collateral
would better protect the creditor and its security interest if this is in-
8. UCC § 9-109 (2000) (amended 2001).
9. Id. at § 9-109(1).
10. In re Beransen, 152 B.R. 427(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1993).
11. Id. at 429.
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deed the case. The debtor of In re Bradel signed up for a Montgomery
Ward credit card which gave security interest in every consumer good
purchased by the debtor with his card. 15 At issue was whether the
description of the collateral combined with a Montgomery Ward in-
ventory number on the sale receipts was a sufficient description of the
collateral. 16 The creditor argued that it had a perfected security inter-
est in the debtor's lawnmower, television set and some jewelry that
the debtor had purchased.' 7 The sales slip for the lawnmower listed
the purchase as a four horsepower lawnmower and the sales slip for
the television described the collateral as a "25 Stereo Trad Cnsle."' 8
The two pieces of jewelry at issue were a gold puff heart charm and a
gold chain. 19 On the sales receipt the charm was listed as, "14K
Charm Oro. . .Puffhrt artw121" and the chain was listed as "14K
Chain." 20
The court held that since it was unlikely that a consumer would own
more than one lawnmower the description on the sales receipt was
sufficient to allow a subsequent creditor to figure out what lawn-
mower was part of Ward's interest. 2' With respect to the television,
the court determined that even though a consumer may have more
than one television the description of the television, combined with
the inventory number, was sufficient to determine what television was
part of Ward's security interest.22 The court also found the descrip-
tion of the puff heart charm to be sufficient. 23 Given the shape of the
charm, the description would allow a subsequent creditor to deter-
mine what piece of jewelry the receipt was referring to.24
The court found that "14K Chain" failed to adequately describe the
collateral that Wards had an interest in.25 A consumer may have more
than one 14-carat gold chain and there was nothing in the receipt
description that would allow for identification of Ward's gold chain
over some another dealer's gold chain.26
15. In re Bradel, No. 89 A 1027, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1334, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Il. June 19,
1990).
16. Id. at *4.
17. Id. at *5.
18. Id. at *4.
19. Id.
20. In re Bradel, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1334, at *4.
21. Id. at *21.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *21-22.
25. In re Bradel, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1334,.at *22.
26. Id.
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This case exemplifies the problems that drafters have with describ-
ing the collateral in connection with consumer goods. The drafters of
security agreements have to be able to draft agreements broadly
enough to allow for "wiggle" room in case they have to go to court to
fight for collateral which is not specifically mentioned in the agree-
ment or financing statement. However, these same drafters have to
describe what consumer good they have an interest in with enough
specificity so that if a consumer has more than one of that item in
their household, the creditor will be able to identify the one that they
have an interest in.
Under Revised Article 9, "consumer goods" are still defined as
goods which are used or bought by a buyer primarily for personal rea-
sons or household consumption.27 Since there was no drastic change
in the definition of "consumer goods," it is unlikely that the courts will
interpret cases any differently under Revised Article 9. In addition, it
is unlikely that a creditor would change its description of "consumer
goods" in a security agreement or financing statement.
IV. INVENTORY
In contrast to the necessary evil of a specific description for con-
sumer goods, inventory does not have to be described with much spec-
ificity at all. This is because the courts have routinely held that
inventory, by its very nature, is supposed to change. If it is to con-
stantly change, then a creditor cannot be held responsible to describe
with detail, the collateral in which they are taking for security.
The debtor in Mid City Bank, Inc. v. Omaha Butcher Supply, Inc.28
was a wholesaler of restaurant and supermarket supplies, such as
knives, cutting tables and flatware.29 The security agreement listed
"all equipment, supplies and parts" as collateral for a loan.30 The
creditor did not list "inventory" or use the definition of inventory in
either the security agreement or financing statement.31 "Inventory"
was held to be part of the debtor's "equipment, supplies and parts"
since the debtor was in the business of supplying "equipment, supplies
and parts" to restaurants and supermarkets. 32 Though not specifically
mentioned in the description, the court found that the creditor in-
27. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(23) (2005). "Consumer goods" means goods that are used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Id.
28. 385 N.W.2d 917 (Neb. 1986).
29. Id. at 920.
30. Id. at 919.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 922.
2006]
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tended to take a security interest in the debtor's inventory because if
the creditor took an interest in the equipment, supplies and parts of
the debtor, it must have intended upon taking an interest in its
inventory.33
The court in the case of In re Florida Bay Trading Company34 held
that it is not necessary to list "inventory" as part of the creditor's in-
terest if it can reasonably be determined that the parties intended it to
be part of the interest.35 The debtor imported foreign reptile skins.36
The creditor filed a security agreement and financing statement, se-
curing an interest in 63,082 skins.37 The security agreement did not
state what kind of skins they were although it did give the lot number,
pack number, and tanner identification number of the Tegue lizard
skins.38 The court held that both of the parties knew the Tegue skins
were to be used as collateral. 39 Here, the court found it unnecessary
for the debtor to specifically state what the inventory was because the
court was able to deduce from the agreements what the parties' intent
was.
40
A reoccurring problem has been whether to automatically include
after-acquired inventory in the security interest of a creditor in a
debtor's inventory. It has been generally accepted that inventory is to
include after-acquired inventory. Since inventory by its nature is con-
stantly changing there is little reason to require creditors to list after-
acquired inventory as a separate security interest from inventory.
However, In re Balcain Equipment Corporation took exception to this
rule.41 The creditor had a security interest in "all accounts receivable
now existing or hereafter arising; all inventory held in connection with
the business of borrower. '42 According to the court, "the Uniform
Commercial Code contemplates the security agreement should clearly
spell out any claims to after-acquired collateral" which the court be-
lieved would extend to after-acquired inventory.43 Since the creditor
specifically mentioned after-acquired account receivables and not af-
ter-acquired inventory the court determined that the creditor must
33. Mid City Bank, 385 N.W.2d at 922.
34. 177 B.R. 374 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
35. Id. at 381-82.
36. Id. at 377.
37. Id. at 379.
38. Id.
39. In re Florida Bay Trading Co., 177 B.R. at 381.
40. Id.
41. In re Balcain Equip. Corp., 80 B.R. 462 (Bankr. C.D. I11. 1987).
42. Id. at 461.
43. Id. at 462.
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have intended not to take an interest in after-acquired inventory of
the debtor.44
In re Cilek also required strict compliance with the Code.45 The
debtor owned a Honda dealership which obtained financing for its in-
ventory through the creditor who took an interest in the inventory.
However, the financing statement only stated that an interest in "all
Honda motorcycles for which (the creditor) gives purchase money fi-
nancing, together with any other property now or hereafter acquired
in which (the debtor) has an interest. '46 The court held that the
description did not meet the requirements of the Code because it
failed to reference any types of collateral as set forth by the Code,
such as goods, inventory, equipment, accounts, general intangibles,
and instruments. 47 The creditor's use of "all Honda motorcycles" was
not sufficient because it merely summarized the collateral, "instead of
itemizing collateral as required. ' 48 Since the creditor did not use
"Code specific" terms, there was no description of the collateral. 49
However even if the creditor had listed by serial numbers and VIN
numbers the items of collateral, it would seem that had the creditor
listed "all after-acquired Honda motorcycles" the court would still
have found that to be an inadequate description of the collateral.
As with "consumer goods," the definition of "inventory" under Re-
vised Article 9 has not changed significantly. The only addition made
to the definition was that "inventory" in fact includes leased goods
which the former Article 9 did not include.50 Even though no cases
have begun litigation on this point, courts may begin to see cases
where they may have to interpret whether or not "leased inventory" is
implicit in a security agreement or a financing statement under the
general category of "inventory." The courts will have to determine if
a creditor is to take a security interest not only in the "inventory" of
44. Id.
45. 115 B.R. 974 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
46. Id. at 990.
47. Id. at 994.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(48) (2005). This provision states:
(48) "Inventory" means goods, other than farm products, which:
(A) are leased by a person as lessor;
(B) are held by a person for sale or lease or to be furnished under a contract of
service;
(C) are furnished by a person under a contract of service; or
(D) consist of raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a
business.
2006]
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the debtor but also any "after-leased inventory" of the debtor. This
quandary may arise when the debtor is engaged in a business where
leasing of the inventory is not done in the ordinary course of that
business.
V. EQUIPMENT
A third category of "goods" under the former Article 9 is "equip-
ment." A "good" will fall under the category of "equipment" if it is
"used or bought for use primarily in business.. .or if the goods are not
included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer
goods... -51 If the collateral is not used primarily in the business, the
collateral could still fall under equipment if it is found not to be inven-
tory, farm products or consumer goods.
The case of In re: Harbour Lights Marina, Inc.5 2 provides an exam-
ple of how a court determines if an item of collateral falls under the
category of "equipment. ' 53 At issue were the gangplanks of a floating
restaurant. 54 The debtor believed them to be "inventory" whereas the
creditor argued that they were "equipment. ' 55 The court used a two-
step inquiry put forth by James White and Robert Summers.56 The
first inquiry, a purely objective test, was whether or not the gang-
planks were within the scope of the security agreement.57 Since the
financing statement did cover equipment, the court found that the
gangplanks should be within the scope of the financing statement. 58
The second inquiry, a subjective test, was whether the parties actually
intended for the gangplanks to be covered by the financing statement.
The court determined that the parties did not intend for the gang-
planks to be covered since there was no evidence that the debtor in-
tended to give an interest in the gangplanks specifically. With this
reasoning, more weight is given to the actual intent of the parties
rather than the scope of the language in a financing statement or se-
curity agreement. 59
51. U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (2000) (amended 2001).
52. 146 B.R. 963 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992).
53. Id. at 969.
54. Id. at 967.
55. Id. at 969.
56. Id. (citing JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 22-4
(3d ed. 1988)).
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In In re Flores de Mexico, Inc. the court had to determine what
category of collateral a rose producer's rose bushes fell under. 60
Since the debtor in this case was a rose producer, the question before
the court was whether the rose bushes constituted fixtures or equip-
ment.61 The court quickly ruled out the rose bushes as being a con-
sumer good and determined that the bushes themselves did not
constitute inventory of the debtor since the bushes themselves were
not sold to consumers.62 The court determined that the bushes were
not crops since only the blossoms of the bushes were harvested, not
the whole bush.63 The bushes were held not to be equipment even
though they were used primarily for business, but rather were held to
constitute fixtures.64 "The evidence shows that the rose bushes were
planted directly into the earth, and that each bush has a root system
that extends three or four feet into the earth. Thus, the bushes were
affixed to the realty . ... This Court therefore finds that the rose
bushes had become so attached to the real estate that an interest in
them arose under real estate law and that they became fixtures." 65
However, it is worth noting that the court in this case made no men-
tion of the ability of the rose bushes to be dug up in determining the
rose bushes to be "fixtures" of the land.
The court in Citizens Bank and Trust v. Gibson Lumber Company66
found that an omnibus clause in a security agreement cannot always
save a creditor's interest. The creditor in Citizens Bank and Trust had
listed several pieces of equipment as its security interest but also had a
non-limiting clause in the agreement. 67 The three pieces of equipment
in question were not listed but were ostensibly covered by the omni-
bus clause "all sawmill equipment. '68 Even though the court found
the equipment in question to be covered by the omnibus clause, the
court remanded to determine whether the parties had subjectively in-
tended to cover the equipment in question.69 The court did not give
any weight to the non-limiting clause which was included in the item-
ized list of collateral. 70 Without clear and convincing evidence that the
three pieces of equipment were intended as collateral, the ambiguity
60. In re Flores de N. M., Inc., 151 B.R. 571, 577 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1993).
61. Id. at 579-80.
62. Id. at 579.
63. Id. at 580.
64. Id. at 582.
65. In re Flores de N. M., 151 B.R. at 582.
66. 96 B.R. 751, 754 (Bankr. D. Ken. 1989).
67. Id. at 752.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 754.
70. See id.
2006]
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would have been construed against the drafter. 71 Here, it seemed as
though the creditor had effectively covered their tracks in order to
secure its collateral by using an itemized list, a non-limiting clause as
well as an omnibus clause. However, the court seemed to have indi-
cated that it is safer for a creditor to use the general categories of
collateral rather than an itemized list of collateral in order to secure
an interest.
Another use of limiting adjectives with a general category of collat-
eral is the case of Morasch Meats, Inc. v. Western Boxed Meats Distrib-
utors, Inc.72 The creditor listed specific items of equipment of the
debtor, who was in the meat processing business.73 The security
agreement listed as collateral "all additions, attachments, accessories
and repairs at any time made or placed upon the Equipment shall
become part of the Equipment and. . .shall be the property of the
[Debtor]. '' 74 The court held that the language of the security agree-
ment limited the creditor's interest to those unlisted items of equip-
ment which could be attached to or placed upon the specifically listed
equipment. 75
Revised Article 9 defines "equipment" as "goods other than inven-
tory, farm products, or consumer goods."'76 This dramatically cut
down the definition under the former Article 9 which had a "primary
use" test that allowed the courts to determine if the collateral was
equipment of the debtor. 77 Even so, the new definition gives courts a
new test to determine if collateral is equipment: if it does not fall into
the other three categories of collateral, by default, it is equipment.
The Comments to the Revised Article 9 do not shed light on why the
drafters excluded the old test "primarily used in the business" test.
An assumption can be made that the drafters believed that the courts
were going to determine if the collateral was used in the business of
the debtor and perhaps thought the extra language to be superfluous.
Although the new definition of "equipment" under Revised 9-102(33)
excludes a substantial portion of the definition under the former Arti-
cle 9, in all likelihood, the new definition will not change how credi-
tors take a security interest in the equipment of a debtor nor will it
change how the courts define "equipment."
71. Citizens Bank and Trust, 96 B.R. at 754.
72. 971 P.2d 426 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
73. Id. at 428.
74. Id. at 427.
75. Id. at 430.
76. U.C.C § 9-102(33) (2005) (stating that "'Equipment' means goods other than inventory,
farm products, or consumer goods.").
77. U.C.C. § 9-109(2) (2000) (amended 2001).
[Vol. 4:235
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VI. FARM PRODUCTS
The last category of "goods" under the former Article 9 is "farm
products." Former 9-109 defined "farm products" as, "crops or live-
stock or supplies used or produced in farming operations.. .and if they
are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening, grazing
or other farming operations. ' 78 Farm products are broken down into
three areas: farm equipment, livestock and crops.
Judges are sometimes forced to become linguists when interpreting
documents. A description of the collateral in a security agreement as
"all farm machinery, equipment, supplies, feed and livestock now
owned or hereafter acquired" required a court to decide whether
"farm" modified equipment and supplies.79 The court overruled a
lower court by holding that the "equipment" and "supplies" were in-
deed modified by "farm. ' 80 The court again referred to the "notice
purpose" of former 9-110 and held that the description of the collat-
eral in the security agreement would have put a prudent subsequent
creditor on notice to search what collateral was encumbered by a prior
security interest.81
In order to perfect a security interest in a farmer-debtor's livestock,
former Article 9 did not require a locator clause in the security agree-
ment and the financing statement.82 The court in First Bank v. East-
78. U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (2000) (amended 2001).
79. Prod. Credit Assoc. of W. Cent. Minn. v. Bartos, 430 N.W. 2d 238, 241 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
80. Id. at 241-42.
81. Id. at 242.
82. U.C.C. § 9-402 (2000) (amended 2001). This provision is titled "Formal Requisites of Fi-
nancing Statement; Amendments; Mortgage as Financing Statement" and states:
(1) A financing statement is sufficient if it gives the names of the debtor and the
secured party, is signed by the debtor, gives an address of the secured party from which
information concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address
of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of
collateral. A financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a
security interest otherwise attaches. When the financing statement covers crops grow-
ing or to be grown, the statement must also contain a description of the real estate
concerned. When the financing statement covers timber to be cut or covers minerals or
the like (including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or
when the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) and the collat-
eral is goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement must also comply with
subsection (5). A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if
it contains the above information and is signed by the debtor. A carbon, photographic
or other reproduction of a security agreement or a financing statement is sufficient as a
financing statement if the security agreement so provides or if the original has been
filed in this state.
(2) A financing statement which otherwise complies with subsection (1) is sufficient
when it is signed by the secured party instead of the debtor if it is filed to perfect a
security interest in
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(a) collateral already subject to a security interest in another jurisdiction when it is
brought into this state, or when the debtor's location is changed to this state. Such a
financing statement must state that the collateral was brought into this state or that the
debtor's location was changed to this state under such circumstances; or
(b) proceeds under Section 9-306 if the security interest in the original collateral
was perfected. Such a financing statement must describe the original collateral; or
(c) collateral as to which the filing has lapsed; or
(d) collateral acquired after a change of name, identity or corporate structure of
the debtor (subsection (7)).
(3) A form substantially as follows is sufficient to comply with subsection (1):
Name of debtor (or assignor) .........
Address .........
Name of secured party (or assignee) .........
Address .........
1. This financing statement covers the following types (or items) of property:
(Describe) .........
2. (If collateral is crops) The above described crops are growing or are to be
grown on:
(Describe Real Estate) .........
3. (If applicable) The above goods are to become fixtures on
(Describe Real Estate) ...... and this financing statement is to be filed
[for record] in the real estate records. (If the debtor does not have an interest of re-
cord) The name of a record owner is ......
4. (If products of collateral are claimed) Products of the collateral are also
covered.
(use whichever is applicable) (Signature of Debtor (or Assignor))
(Signature of Secured Party (or Assignee))
(4) A financing statement may be amended by filing a writing signed by both the
debtor and the secured party. An amendment does not extend the period of effective-
ness of a financing statement. If any amendment adds collateral, it is effective as to the
added collateral only from the filing date of the amendment. In this Article, unless the
context otherwise requires, the term "financing statement" means the original financing
statement and any amendments.
(5) A financing statement covering timber to be cut or covering minerals or the like
(including oil and gas) or accounts subject to subsection (5) of Section 9-103, or a fi-
nancing statement filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-313) where the debtor is not a
transmitting utility, must show that it covers this type of collateral, must recite that it is
to be filed [for record] in the real estate records, and the financing statement must
contain a description of the real estate [sufficient if it were contained in a mortgage of
the real estate to give constructive notice of the mortgage under the law of this state]. If
the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real estate, the financing statement
must show the name of a record owner.
(6) A mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing from the
date of its recording if
(a) the goods are described in the mortgage by item or type; and
(b) the goods are or are to become fixtures related to the real estate described in
the mortgage; and
(c) the mortgage complies with the requirements for a financing statement in this
section other than a recital that it is to be filed in the real estate records; and
(d) the mortgage is duly recorded.
No fee with reference to the financing statement is required other than the regular
recording and satisfaction fees with respect to the mortgage.
(7) A financing statement sufficiently shows the name of the debtor if it gives the individ-
ual, partnership or corporate name of the debtor, whether or not it adds other trade names
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ern Livestock Co. 83 held that a creditor's locator clause for a farmer's
livestock was sufficient even though the livestock were moved from
the original farm where they were being pastured.84 The locator
clause in the financing statement was not seriously misleading because
even though it may have been the wrong address, a subsequent credi-
tor would have been put on notice to check what livestock was encum-
bered by the creditor's security interest.8 5
After-acquired livestock has posed a problem to creditors as well.
Since livestock does not turnover like inventory, a creditor must de-
termine whether to specifically state that its interest extends to after-
acquired livestock. In Raasch v. Tri-County Trust Co.,86 after the
farmer-debtor had pledged his sows and boars, the creditor only listed
the total number of livestock on the security agreement. 87 Subse-
quently, the farmer-debtor purchased more livestock with a loan from
another creditor which made it impossible to identify the livestock
which were previously encumbered. 88 Even though the creditor
should have described the livestock with more specificity, the court
held that the description was sufficient because the subsequent credi-
tor did have actual knowledge that the livestock were subject to a
prior security interest.8 9 The court did not elaborate, however, as to
what would happen if there was no actual knowledge as to the prior
security interest.
To perfect a security interest in crops of the debtor-farmer a credi-
tor has to use a locator clause in its financing statement. 90 The locator
clause requirement is to make sure the creditor has described with
specificity what crops are encumbered and to allow subsequent credi-
or names of partners. Where the debtor so changes his name or in the case of an organiza-
tion its name, identity or corporate structure that a filed financing statement becomes seri-
ously misleading, the filing is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired
by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless a new appropriate financing
statement is filed before the expiration of that time. A filed financing statement remains
effective with respect to collateral transferred by the debtor even though the secured party
knows of or consents to the transfer.
(8) A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is
effective even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading.
Id.
83. 837 F.Supp. 792, (S.D. Miss. 1993).
84. Id. at 796.
85. Id. at 803.
86. 712 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
87. Id. at 6.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 10.
90. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (2000) (amended 2001).
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tors to identify what crops may or may not be part of the creditor's
security interest.
Three brothers had created a farming partnership and allowed a
creditor to take an interest in some of their crops.91 Before taking an
interest in the land, the creditor had a land survey done of the land
where the brothers would grow the crops and the results of the survey
were used in both the security agreement and the financing statement.
However, the court found that the land survey description had "seri-
ously erroneous descriptions of quarter sections and townships" which
kept the creditor's security interest from attaching.92 Even though the
farmer-debtor knew what lands were to be encumbered by the secur-
ity interest a subsequent prudent creditor would be misled by the
description of the land where the crops were to be grown.93
Another problem arises when the farmer-debtor is not the owner of
the land but merely a lessee. In MFA Inc. v. W.L. Pointer,94 the lessee
was farming 1,300 acres of land which was subject to a landlord's
lien. 95 The landlord subordinated its lien on 350 acres of crops be-
longing to the lessee-farmer so that the lessee could use those acres to
secure a loan to begin farming operations. The lessee gave a security
interest of 350 acres of beans to a subsequent creditor.96 The landlord
sold the entire crop after the lessee defaulted and the subsequent
creditor claimed conversion of its security interest. Since the 350
acres were part of a larger plot of land, the court held the description
to be insufficient since a prudent subsequent creditor would not be
able to identify what part of the 1,300 acres was encumbered by the
subsequent creditor's security interest.97 In order for the description
to be valid, the creditor must have included some kind of indication of
where the 350 acres was to be located within the larger plot.
Identification of crops is a different creature than identification of
farm equipment and livestock because crops are grown and harvested
yearly. Due to the fact that crops are an annual security for a creditor,
a creditor must be vigilant in making sure they file an annual security
agreement for crops. However, a creditor can take an interest in fu-
ture crops of the farmer-debtor without having to file annually. The
creditor in In re Pulley98 did not state in its financing statement and
91. In re Waters, 90 B.R. 946, 952 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988).
92. Id. at 964.
93. Id. at 961.
94. 869 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
95. Id. at 110.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 112.
98. 75 B.R. 168 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987).
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security agreement what year of crops it was taking an interest in.99
For the security interest to have been valid, the creditor should have
stated in its financing statement that its security interest extended to
"crops now growing or hereafter planted."
As already discussed, in order to take a security interest in "growing
crops" a creditor must include a locator clause in its financing state-
ment.10 0 However, if a creditor's security interest is for crops which
have already been harvested, it does not need to have a locator clause
because they are no longer "growing crops" but "farm products".
One court found that a financing statement which described the col-
lateral as "crops, livestock, supplies, other farm products and farm and
other equipment. . ." was a proper description of crops which had al-
ready been harvested. 10 1 The farmer-debtors argued that since the
creditor was taking an interest in crops, there needed to be a locator
clause. The court held that when crops are severed from the land,
"crops" turn into "farm products" which do not need to have a locator
clause.10 2
Perhaps the most memorable crop case is In re: Findley.10 3 The
debtor-farm gave a security interest to a creditor in his "crop" of cat-
fish. 10 4 However the security agreement of the creditor never listed a
locator clause of the catfish as required for crops. 10 5 The creditor ar-
gued that the catfish were more like livestock rather than crops so that
they did not have to give a locator clause in its security agreement. 10 6
The court held the catfish to be crops, not livestock, and found the
creditor's security agreement to be valid even without a locator
clause.10 7
The definition of "farm products" under Revised Article 9 clarifies
the scope of "farm products." Former Article 9 defined "farm prod-
ucts" as crops, supplies or livestock used by the debtor for farming
operations. 10 8 With much litigation over what constituted "livestock"
and "crops," the Revised Article 9 more clearly defines farm products.
Under Revised Article 9, "crops" are grown not only on land but on
99. Id. at 169.
100. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (2000) (amended 2001).
101. U.S. v. Smith, 832 F.2d 774 (2nd Cir. 1987).
102. Id. at 778.
103. 76 B.R. 547 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1987).
104. Id. at 548.
105. Id. at 551-52.
106. See id. at 551.
107. Id. at 554.
108. U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (2000) (amended 2001).
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"trees, vines and bushes" as well. 10 9 In an attempt to avoid the
problems of Findley, Revised Article 9 also defines "crops" as
"aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations" which allows
crops to also be grown in water. 110 However, whether the collateral
constitutes "livestock" or "crops" even if they are grown in water is
still up to the courts on a case-by-case basis."'
Furthermore, the Revised Article 9 definition makes it clear that
"products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states" are to
be "farm products.' 12 Even though this language was the same lan-
guage used in the former Article 9, the Comments to the Revised Ar-
ticle 9 elaborates further that "farm products" are no longer "farm
products" when the crops or products of livestock are subjected to
some manufacturing process and become "inventory" of the debtor."13
Under Revised Article 9 there no longer needs to be a description
of the real-property on which crops are grown. The Comment to the
Revised Article 9 makes mention that it seemed "unwise" to require a
description of the cropland. 114 To delete this former requirement
from the revisions does make sense given that the new requirements
of a financing statement are much less than they were before under
the former Article 9. To allow a creditor to list as collateral "all assets
of the debtor" in its financing statement but then to require a specific
location of where the collateral is to be held would defeat the very
purpose of Revised 9-108, which was to allow for a more general
description of the collateral.
VII. REAL ESTATE
Real estate can also be used as collateral for a security interest.
Even though a loan for which the collateral would be real estate
109. U.C.C. § 9-102(34)(i) (2005). The exact language of the Revised Article 9 provision
states:
(34) "Farm products" means goods, other than standing timber, with respect to which
the debtor is engaged in a farming operation and which are:
(A) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, including:
(i) crops produced on trees, vines, and bushes; and
(ii) aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations.
(B) livestock, born or unborn, including aquatic goods produced in aquacultural
operations;
(C) supplies used or produced in a farming operation; or
(D) products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states.
Id.
110. U.C.C. § 9-102(34)(ii) (2005).
111. Id. § 9-102 cmt. 4(a).
112. Id. § 9-102(34)(D).
113. Id. §9-102 cmt. 4(a).
114. Id. § 9-502 cmt. 4.
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would fall outside the scope of Article 9, the loan could fall under a
secured transaction if the "fixtures" of the property are the security.
"Fixtures" will also be discussed under real estate although under for-
mer 9-313, "fixtures" are a type of "good" which are so related to the
land "that an interest in them arises under real estate law." 115 Leases,
115. U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(a) (2000) (amended 2001). This provision is titled "Priority of Security
Interests in Fixtures" and states:
(1) In this section and in the provisions of Part 4 of this Article referring to fixture
filing, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) goods are "fixtures" when they become so related to particular real estate that an
interest in them arises under real estate law
(b) a "fixture filing" is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would
be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering goods which are or are to be-
come fixtures and conforming to the requirements of subsection (5) of Section 9-402
(c) a mortgage is a "construction mortgage" to the extent that it secures an obligation
incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the acquisition cost
of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates.
(2) A security interest under this Article may be created in goods which are fixtures or
may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest exists under this
Article in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land.
(3) This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures pursuant to
real estate law.
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting interest of
an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of the encum-
brancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security interest is per-
fected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten days thereafter,
and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real
estate; or
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encum-
brancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any conflicting
interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the debtor has an
interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily removable
replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods, and before the goods
become fixtures the security interest is perfected by any method permitted by this Arti-
cle; or
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or equitable
proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method permitted by this
Article.
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over the con-
flicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security interest or has
disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner. If
the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the security interest continues for a reason-
able time.
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which fall under the scope of Article 2A, can be a type of collateral
which is under Article 9 so long as it is a "true lease." The main char-
acteristic of a true lease is that the collateral which is being leased
must, after the duration of the lease, have residual value when it is
returned to the lessor. 116 In addition to having "true leases" under
Article 9, land trusts can be collateral for a secured transaction as
well.117
A debtor had given his interest in a land trust agreement as collat-
eral to a creditor.1 8 In the financing statement, the creditor's descrip-
tion of the collateral read, "all of Debtor's right, title and beneficial
interest in that certain real property described on Schedule 'A' at-
tached. ."119 The court held that the description of the collateral in
the financing statement was not sufficient because a land trust is a
type of personal property, not real property. For the creditor to use
the term "real property" instead of "personal property" was found to
be seriously misleading because the type of collateral was improper
and would not have properly informed a subsequent searcher that it
had an interest in a land trust.' 20
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to subsec-
tions (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction mort-
gage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures before
the completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to refinance a construc-
tion mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the construction
mortgage.
(7) In cases not within the preceding subsections, a security interest in fixtures is
subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real
estate who is not the debtor.
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of the real
estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral
from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real
estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of
any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the
absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A person entitled
to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives ade-
quate security for the performance of this obligation.
Id.
116. ROBERT S. SUMMERS & JAMES J. WHITE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §21-3 (5th ed.
2000) (citing Edward Huddleson, Old Wine in New Bottles: UCC Article 2A Leases, 39 ALA.
L.REV. 615, 625 (1988).
117. U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (2000) (amended 2001). This Article applies to security interest cre-
ated by contract including pledge, assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's
lien, equipment trust, conditional sale, trust receipt, other hen or title retention contract and
lease or consignment intended as security. Id.
118. In re Shams, 54 B.R. 61, 61 (Bankr. S.D. Fla 1985).
119. Id. at 62.
120. Id.
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Another way for creditors to bring a real estate transaction under
Article 9 is to take a security interest in fixtures which are on the land.
The court in In re: Sand and Sage Farm and Ranch, Inc.12 1 had to first
determine if a center pivot irrigation system was "farm equipment" or
a "fixture."'1 22 The creditor had filed a financing statement which
merely took as collateral the farm equipment of the debtor-farmer. 23
The court looked at how the irrigation system was installed and the
intent of the debtor-farmer when he installed the system and deter-
mined that the system was meant to be permanent, therefore, the irri-
gation system was held to be a fixture.124 In order for the irrigation
system to be held as security the creditor in this case needed to have
specifically mentioned that fixtures were to be part of its collateral.
125
Another debtor-farmer had built a number of barns on his tobacco
farm in order to store his tobacco. 126 The manner in which these to-
bacco barns were attached to the land was complex and costly and the
court found that the use of these barns was consistent with the use of
the farm, which was to cure tobacco.127 These were all factors that the
court used to determine that the barns were fixtures. The creditor had
filed security agreements and financing statements in connection with
the barns but never used the collateral term of "fixtures."' 128 The
court found the description of the barns as "appurtenances" was
insufficient. 2 9
A creditor may be able to take an interest in the real estate of the
debtor, but the interest has to encompass fixtures on the real estate.
In order to avoid a non-attachment problem, a creditor would want to
state in the security agreement and the financing statement that they
are taking an interest specifically in fixtures and in all additions and
substitutions made to the real estate of the debtor.
VIII. GENERAL INTANGIBLES
The residual category of collateral is that of general intangibles.
This category is a catch-all category which encompasses other types of
security which the creditor cannot physically possess or control.
Under the former Article 9, "general intangibles" were defined as
121. 266 B.R. 507 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2001).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 510.
124. Id. at 512.
125. Id. at 514.
126. U.S. v. Gaskins, 748 F.Supp. 366 (E.D. N.C. 1990).
127. Id. at 369.
128. Id. at 368.
129. Id. at 371.
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"any personal property other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, doc-
uments, instruments, investment property, rights to proceeds of writ-
ten letters of credit and money."'1 30 "Account receivables" and
"proceeds" are two types of general intangibles which a creditor
would want to have as part of its security for any business. "Pro-
ceeds" are the money which is given in exchange for some collat-
eral.1 31 In the realm of intellectual property this category would
create the bulk of the collateral for a creditor. Goodwill, trademarks
130. U.C.C. § 9-106 (2000) (amended 2001) (stating that "'Account' means any right to pay-
ment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument
or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance. 'General intangibles' means
any personal property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper,
documents, instruments, investment property, rights to proceeds of written letters of credit, and
money. All rights to payment earned or unearned under a charter or other contract involving
the use or hire of a vessel and all rights incident to the charter or contract are accounts.").
131. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (2000) (amended 2001). This provision is titled "'Proceeds'; Secured
Party's Rights on Disposition of Collateral" and states:
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or
other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or dam-
age to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a person other
than a party to the security agreement. Any payments or distributions made with re-
spect to investment property collateral are proceeds. Money, checks, deposit accounts,
and the like are "cash proceeds". All other proceeds are "non-cash proceeds".
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collat-
eral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition
was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected security interest if the
interest in the original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a perfected security
interest and becomes unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the debtor
unless
(a) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are collat-
eral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office or offices where
the financing statement has been filed and, if the proceeds are acquired with cash pro-
ceeds, the description of collateral in the financing statement indicates the types of
property constituting the proceeds; or
(b) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral and the proceeds are identi-
fiable cash proceeds;
(c) the original collateral was investment property and the proceeds are identifiable
cash proceeds; or
(d) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before the expiration of the ten day
period.
Except as provided in this section, a security interest in proceeds can be perfected only
by the methods or under the circumstances permitted in this Article for original collat-
eral of the same type.
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a debtor, a secured
party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected security interest
only in the following proceeds:
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and even "know-how" can be used as value by a debtor who has a
business without tangible inventory. A creditor would want to make
sure that the general intangibles of a farmer would be collateral be-
cause government termination payments and payments-in-kind can be
of significant value. Even if the creditor believes that the debtor does
not have any general intangibles to which a security interest could be
claimed, the creditor should nonetheless still take an interest because
there may be something that the creditor overlooked that may be of
significant value.
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds and in separate deposit accounts containing only
proceeds;
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money which is neither commingled
with other money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency
proceedings;
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks and the like which are not depos-
ited in a deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings; and
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts of the debtor in which proceeds have been commin-
gled with other funds, but the perfected security interest under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right to set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any cash proceeds received by
the debtor within ten days before the institution of the insolvency proceedings less the
sum of (I) the payments to the secured party on account of cash proceeds received by
the debtor during such period and (II) the cash proceeds received by the debtor during
such period to which the secured party is entitled under paragraphs (a) through (c) of
this subsection (4).
(5) If a sale of goods results in an account or chattel paper which is transferred by the
seller to a secured party, and if the goods are returned to or are repossessed by the
seller or the secured party, the following rules determine priorities:
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of sale, for an indebtedness of the seller
which is still unpaid, the original security interest attaches again to the goods and con-
tinues as a perfected security interest if it was perfected at the time when the goods
were sold. If the security interest was originally perfected by a filing which is still effec-
tive, nothing further is required to continue the perfected status; in any other case, the
secured party must take possession of the returned or repossessed goods or must file.
(b) An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper has a security interest in the goods
against the transferor. Such security interest is prior to a security interest asserted
under paragraph (a) to the extent that the transferee of the chattel paper was entitled
to priority under Section 9-308.
(c) An unpaid transferee of the account has a security interest in the goods against the
transferor. Such security interest is subordinate to a security interest asserted under
paragraph (a).
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee asserted under paragraph (b) or (c) must
be perfected for protection against creditors of the transferor and purchasers of the
returned or repossessed goods.
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The first type of general intangible that will be looked at will be
accounts receivable and proceeds of contracts. Next farming general
intangibles will be discussed followed by a discussion of hotel room
revenues as a general intangible. There will be a discussion of per-
sonal accounts as security collateral and lastly, an assorted mix of gen-
eral intangible cases will be looked at.
Account receivables are the payments made from the sale of inven-
tory. Since the inventory of a debtor should be constantly changing,
there should be a constant account receivable for a debtor's business.
The court in the case of In re Bonds Distributing Company, Inc.132
found that the creditor had a properly perfected security interest in
the after-acquired accounts and inventory of the debtor. 133 The credi-
tor had described the collateral as "all personal property ... all addi-
tional equipment, furniture, and fixtures, supplies, inventory, . . .
accounts receivable .. . including substitutions, additions, replace-
ments, proceeds and proceeds of proceeds .... "134 The court stated
that "because of the particular characteristics of accounts receivable
and inventory and the fact that they are cyclical and constantly turning
over... ," the 'description of account receivables and inventory cre-
ated a security interest in the after-acquired accounts receivables of
the company. 135
However if a debtor and a creditor enter into an agreement at a
time when there are no accounts receivables, it may be found that
after-acquired accounts receivable are not part of the creditor's secur-
ity interest. This was the case for a debtor who had executed a prom-
issory note for a creditor but only had inventory and equipment to
pledge.136 The court held since there were no accounts receivables
and since the debtor never intended to give the creditor an interest in
those future accounts, the creditor could not claim an interest in after-
acquired accounts receivable. 37 In order for a creditor to avoid a
situation such as that, it would be prudent for a creditor to always
include an after-acquired accounts receivable clause in a security
agreement and financing statement.
While "accounts receivable" are a type of personal property, courts
have held that to describe the collateral merely as "personal property"
is insufficient under the former Article 9.138 One court held that the
132. 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 1964 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. Apr. 3, 2000).
133. Id.
134. Id. at *16.
135. Id. at *24.
136. In re Nightway Transportation Co., Inc., 96 B.R. 854, 855 (Bankr. N.D. IlI. 1989).
137. Id. at 859.
138. See, e.g. In re S.E. Emergency Healthcare, P.C., 85 B.R. 170, 172 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
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description of accounts receivable as "personal property" would not
put a subsequent searcher on notice that accounts receivable of the
debtor may be encumbered by a security interest. 139 The court in In
re Boogie Enterprises 40 encountered the same problem: the use of
"personal property" to describe "accounts receivable."' 14 1 The court
determined the description to be insufficient and stated "Perhaps it
would make more sense, in instances where a creditor had a security
interest in all of the debtor's assets, for the Code to release the credi-
tor from the identification requirements for financing statements. But
we are not free to create such an exception.' 42
Furthermore, a court found the description of "all Debtor's in-
come" not to be a sufficient description of a security interest for the
accounts receivable of a debtor either. 43 The court in that case held
that "income" does not describe the "proceeds" of the debtor; there-
fore, a subsequent creditor would not be put on notice that the ac-
counts receivable or proceeds of the debtor would be part of a
security interest. 144
Many cases have dealt with the sufficiency of the description of pro-
ceeds which are to be received sometime in the future through con-
tract rights of the debtor. In one example, the debtor was a builder of
residential homes. 45 The debtor contracted for the construction of
new homes and, upon completion of those homes, received payment
from customers. 46 The creditor of the debtor-builder wanted the pro-
ceeds of the building contracts of the debtor after the debtor went into
bankruptcy. 1.47 The description of the collateral in the creditor's fi-
nancing statement read "all property rights of any kind whatsoever,
whether real, personal, mixed or otherwise, and whether tangible or
intangible, encumbered by the above-mentioned mortgage. ' 148 The
description did not create a security interest in the proceeds of the
building contracts because future building contracts would not be cov-
ered as "all property rights.' 49
139. Id.
140. 866 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1989).
141. Id. at 1173.
142. Id. at 1175.
143. In re Cottage Grove Hosp., 233 B.R. 493, 496 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1999).
144. Id.
145. In re I.A. Durbin, Inc., 46 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985).
146. Id. at 597.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 600.
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As stated previously, there is a fine line between specificity and
vagueness which the creditor has to walk when writing a security
agreement and a financing statement. If the creditor uses a vague
description a court may hold that the creditor's security interest never
attached. On the other hand, if a creditor uses too specific of a
description of the collateral, he or she may be shooting themselves in
the foot by not including collateral which may be of more value to the
creditor. The latter scenario is what happened to the creditor of a real
estate developer in the following example. A developer was con-
verting an apartment building into condominiums and the creditor
made loans to the debtor-developer in connection with this project. 150
The assignment gave the creditor an interest in "all moneys due and to
become due from the sale of condominium units in Shaker Heights
Condominiums."' 151 However the debtor-developer pulled out of the
project because there had not been enough sales of the condomini-
ums, left the building as apartments and sold to a subsequent buyer. 152
The creditor sought the proceeds of sale of the apartment building.' 53
The court held that the creditor did not perfect its security interest in
the apartment building, rather, the creditor merely had a security in-
terest in the condominium building which never was completed.' 54
The creditor should have foreseen the possibility of failure and
planned accordingly in order to recover the collateral.
Personal accounts are another type of general intangible. A credi-
tor may take a security interest in the personal accounts of a debtor
but there are heightened requirements put upon the creditor attempt-
ing to do so. Notably, it is prudent for a creditor to specifically name
the account and where it is being held if they want to perfect a secur-
ity interest in an account of the debtor. In re Richman involved a
creditor whose collateral included all amounts on deposit in account
no. 6282588026038.155 The court held that the creditor's description
did identify what was being pledged and the court found that the bro-
kerage firm which held the account had actual knowledge of the credi-
tor's security interest.' 56 Perhaps a more important fact in this case is
that the creditor never filed a financing statement in connection with
the brokerage account but the court still found that the creditor prop-
150. In re St. Onge, No. 94-CV-1441(RSP), 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2029, at *1 (N.D. N.Y.
February 21, 1996).
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *9
155. 181 B.R. 260, 262 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
156. Id. at 264.
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erly perfected its security interest by giving notice to the brokerage
firm of its interest.15 7
Under the former Article 9, a securities account fell under "invest-
ment property" of the debtor.t58 It was sufficient under the former
157. Id. at 265.
158. U.C.C. § 9-115(1)(f)(iii) (2000) (amended 2001). Section 9-115 is titled "Investment
Property" and states:
(1) In this Article:
(a) "Commodity account" means an account maintained by a commodity intermediary
in which a commodity contract is carried for a commodity customer.
(b) "Commodity contract" means a commodity futures contract, an option on a com-
modity futures contract, a commodity option, or other contract that, in each case, is:
(i) traded on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that has been designated as a
contract market for such a contract pursuant to the federal commodities laws; or
(ii) traded on a foreign commodity board of trade, exchange, or market, and is carried
on the books of a commodity intermediary for a commodity customer.
(c) "Commodity customer" means a person for whom a commodity intermediary car-
ries a commodity contract on its books.
(d) "Commodity intermediary" means:
(i) a person who is registered as a futures commission merchant under the federal com-
modities laws; or
(ii) a person who in the ordinary course of its business provides clearance or settlement
services for a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market pursuant to
the federal commodities laws.
(e) "Control" with respect to a certificated security, uncertificated security, or security
entitlement has the meaning specified in Section 8-106. A secured party has control
over a commodity contract if by agreement among the commodity customer, the com-
modity intermediary, and the secured party, the commodity intermediary has agreed
that it will apply any value distributed on account of the commodity contract as di-
rected by the secured party without further consent by the commodity customer. If a
commodity customer grants a security interest in a commodity contract to its own com-
modity intermediary, the commodity intermediary as secured party has control. A se-
cured party has control over a securities account or commodity account if the secured
party has control over all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the
securities account or commodity account.
(f) "Investment property" means:
(i) a security, whether certificated or uncertificated;
(ii) a security entitlement:
(iii) a securities account:
(iv) a commodity contract; or
(v) a commodity account.
(2) Attachment or perfection of a security interest in a securities account is also attach-
ment or perfection of a security interest in all security entitlements carried in the secur-
ities account. Attachment or perfection of a security interest in a commodity account is
also attachment or perfection of a security interest in all commodity contracts carried in
the commodity account.
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Article 9 to describe an interest in a securities account using the term
(3) A description of collateral in a security agreement or financing statement is suffi-
cient to create or perfect a security interest in a certificated security, uncertificated
security, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity
account whether it describes the collateral by those terms, or as investment property, or
by description of the underlying security, financial asset, or commodity contract. A
description of investment property collateral in a security agreement or financing state-
ment is sufficient if it identifies the collateral by specific listing, by category, by quan-
tity, by a computational or allocational formula or procedure, or by any other method,
if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
(4) Perfection of a security interest in investment property is governed by the following
rules:
(a) A security interest in investment property may be perfected by control.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (c) and (d), a security interest in invest-
ment property may be perfected by filing.
(c) If the debtor is a broker or securities intermediary, a security interest in investment
property is perfected when it attaches. The filing of a financing statement with respect
to a security interest in investment property granted by a broker or securities interme-
diary has no effect for purposes of perfection or priority with respect to that security
interest.
(d) If a debtor is a commodity, intermediary, a security interest in a commodity con-
tract or a commodity account is perfected when it attaches. The filing of a financing
statement with respect to a security interest in a commodity contract or a commodity
account granted by a commodity intermediary has no effect for purposes of perfection
or priority with respect to that security interest.
(5) Priority between conflicting security interests in the same investment property is
governed by the following rules:
(a) A security interest of a secured party who has control over investment property has
priority over a security interest of a secured party who does not have control over the
investment property.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (c) and (d), conflicting security inter-
ests of secured parties each of whom has control rank equally.
(c) Except as otherwise agreed by the securities intermediary, a security interest in a
security entitlement or a securities account granted to the debtor's own securities inter-
mediary has priority over any security interest granted by the debtor to another secured
party.
(d) Except as otherwise agreed by the commodity intermediary, a security interest in a
commodity contract or a commodity account granted to the debtor's own commodity
intermediary has priority over any security interest granted by the debtor to another
secured party.
(e) Conflicting security interests granted by a broker, a securities intermediary, or a
commodity intermediary which are perfected without control rank equally.
(f) In all other cases, priority between conflicting security interests in investment prop-
erty is governed by Section 9-312(5), (6), and (7). Section 9-312(4) does not apply to
investment property.
(6) If a security certificate in registered form is delivered to a secured party pursuant to
agreement, a written security agreement is not required for attachment or enforceabil-
ity of the security interest, delivery suffices for perfection of the security interest, and
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"securities account" or "investment property." A creditor, as evi-
denced by Richman, can also use a more specific description by using
an account number. Under Revised 9-102(47), the definition of "in-
vestment property" has not substantially changed from the former Ar-
ticle 9 and the interpretation among the courts dealing with
investment properties will not change dramatically.' 59
An example of an overbroad description of the collateral can be
found in In re Googel.'60 In exchange for a line of credit, the debtor
executed a promissory note in favor of the creditor-bank. 16' The note
had a section entitled, "Setoff Right" to which the creditor had "the
right to apply funds from any deposit account(s) of the [u]ndersigned
. .. to pay all or any portion of any amount overdue under this
note. ' 162 However, under the section headed "Collateral", the credi-
tor did not describe any of the collateral which it was taking a security
interest in.163 The creditor claimed a properly perfected security inter-
est in the account of the debtor which the creditor-bank held because
under the "Collateral" section of the note it stated that the creditor-
bank had an interest in "the collateral and any other property belong-
ing to, standing in the name of or pledged on behalf of the Under-
signed... shall constitute continuing security for any and all liabilities
of the Undersigned." 164 The court found that the description of the
collateral to be insufficient because the creditor-bank had not refer-
enced any "types" of collateral nor had the creditor-bank checked any
boxes on the note which would have given it a security interest in the
accounts of the debtor.165
In Knudson v. Dakota Bank and Trust,166 the court held that a cred-
itor's security agreement failed to take a proper security interest in the
checking account of the debtor. 167 The security agreement created an
the security interest has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by means
other than control, even if a necessary indorsement is lacking.
Id.
159. U.C.C. § 9-102(47) (2005) (stating "'Instrument' means a negotiable instrument or any
other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a
security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by
delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include (i) invest-
ment property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a right to payment arising out
of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.").
160. 130 B.R. 126 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
161. Id. at 127.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 128.
165. Id.
166. 929 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1991).
167. Id. at 1283-84.
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interest in "All Accounts (rights to payment for Goods sold or leased
or for services rendered) of Debtor now existing or hereafter at any
time acquired. '168 The court determined that "all accounts" only ap-
plied to accounts receivable, not to the debtor's checking account. 169
The security agreement executed by the parties had a box designated
"Accounts" which could be checked by the creditor. Since the box
was not checked, the court held that the creditor did not perfect a
security interest in the debtor's checking account. 170
In the case of "deposit accounts," there has been a significant
change not only in definition but in application as well. Under former
9-105, a deposit account was a "demand, time, savings, passbook or
like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan association...
[not] evidenced by a certificate of deposit. ' 171 Former 9-306 which de-
fined "proceeds," categorized a deposit account as a cash proceed. 172
The Comments of Revised Article 9 clarify that an uncertificated
deposit account would be a "deposit account" whereas a certificate of
deposit would allow the collateral to be categorized as an "instru-
ment" if the certificate of deposit is not given in the ordinary course of
the business.173 A deposit account under the Revised Article 9 will no
longer be considered a "general intangible" but rather be its own
"type" of collateral which may be given as security to a creditor.
The third type of general intangibles is "farming intangibles."
These are different types of general intangibles that a farmer may
pledge to a creditor as security. One kind of "farming intangible" that
causes problems for creditors are government payment-in-kinds
(PIKs). PIKs are contract rights between a farmer and the govern-
ment in which the government pays money to a farmer as a subsidy in
exchange for the farmer's promise not to grow a certain crop or pro-
duce a certain farm product. The District Court of Kansas reviewed a
number of cases involving PIKs.174 The court held that PIK payments
fall under "proceeds" even though the crop was never grown. 75 One
of the cases that the court looked at had a financing statement which
168. Id. at 1283.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(e) (2000) (amended 2001) (stating "'Deposit account' means a de-
mand, time, savings, passbook or like account maintained with a bank, savings and loan associa-
tion, credit union or like organization, other than an account evidenced by a certificate of
deposit...").
172. Id. § 9-306(1).
173. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 12 (2005).
174. In re George, 119 B.R. 800, 801 (D. Kan. 1990).
175. Id. at 805.
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gave the creditor an interest in "all contract rights and accounts now
owned and hereafter acquired" as well as the proceeds from the
crops. 176 The court held that the description in the financing state-
ment was sufficient to find that the creditor had a properly perfected
security interest in the PIK payments of the debtor. 177
In addition to PIK payments for crops, the courts have had to cate-
gorize the payments to dairy farmers under a federal milk diversion
program. In one example, the security agreement of a creditor gave
the creditor an interest in the livestock of the debtor which also in-
cluded "all natural increase, purchase, exchange, and issue thereof. ''178
The debtor participated in a federal milk diversion program and was
given payment in exchange for his promise not to produce milk. 179
The court held that the description of the collateral was insufficient to
allow an interest in those payments because the payments were held
not to be proceeds of livestock. 180 "The milk diversion program pay-
ments in the instant case are not the 'proceeds' of anything. They are
entitlements stemming from an agreement the debtors made to pro-
duce less milk - not a subsidy for milk produced. ' 181
The courts struggled under the former Article 9 to categorize the
money that farmers received as part of a government program. For-
mer 9-106 defined "accounts" as [a]ll rights to payments earned...
under a charter or other contract . . . and all rights incident to the
charter or contract are accounts."'1 82 This definition allowed PIKs to
fall under the category of "accounts." Whether the debtor's entitle-
ment to those payments were "proceeds," "general intangibles," "con-
tract rights," or "accounts," it was only on a case-by-case basis that a
determination was made.
Unfortunately Revised Article 9 does not clarify what these pay-
ments are to be considered. The drafters of the Revised Article 9
were of course aware of this situation but no new section was created
to solve this problem. Instead in the Official Comments to 9-102, it is
acknowledged that while there was no codification of what govern-
ment entitlement payments are as a type of collateral, it does provide
that those payments can be "an account, a payment intangible, a gen-
eral intangible other than a payment intangible, or another type of
collateral" which would include proceeds of other collateral of the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. In re Frasch, 53 B.R. 89, 90 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1985).
179. Id. at 90.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. U.C.C. § 9-106 (2000) (amended 2001).
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debtor. 83 Although this may give courts little guidance, it does give
creditors some help when drafting a security agreement and financing
statement which would be sufficient to cover the PIKs of a farmer-
debtor.
Another farming-intangible which came before a court was a cove-
nant not-to-compete between farmers.18 4 A farmer-debtor sold his
distributorship to another farmer and a non-compete clause was exe-
cuted between the parties. The farmer-debtor was given $7,500.00 for
the non-compete clause and the creditor of the farmer-debtor claimed
a security interest in the non-compete clause. 185 The court held that
the creditor did have a security interest in the covenant not to com-
pete because the financing statement of the creditor did cover "all
proceeds, accounts and notes receivables and contract rights presently
in existence or hereafter created. .. 186 Since the financing statement
did state that contract rights were part of its security interest, the court
stated that a third party searching the records would be put on notice
that a covenant not to compete would be included under "contract
rights."' 87
There are cases where the security interest at issue constitutes a pot-
pourri of general intangibles and the courts have had the task of cate-
gorizing each of these interests. One general intangible that came
before a court was an annuities policy of a debtor.'8 8 The court de-
cided that the annuities policy was a general intangible because the
annuitant does not receive an interest in the pot of money from which
payments are paid; rather, they receive an interest only in the pay-
ments themselves. 189
Insurance policies are still out of the realm of Revised Article 9 as
they were under the former Article 9.190 Revised Article 9 does not
define what annuities are but the new definition of "general intangi-
ble" would include annuities, as the court in Custom Coals held. Al-
though the definition of "account" in Revised Article 9 has been
expanded, it would still exclude annuities as an "account" because it
183. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(i) (2005).
184. In re Griffith, 194 B.R. 262, 264 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996).
185. Id. at 264.
186. Id. at 266-67.
187. Id. at 267.
188. See In re Custom Coals Laurel, 258 B.R. 597 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
189. Id. at 603.
190. See U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(8) (2005) (stating that Article 9 does not apply to "a transfer of an
interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance, other than an assignment by
or to a health-care provider of a health-care-insurance receivable and any subsequent assign-
ment of the right to payment, but Sections 9-315 and 9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and
priorities in proceeds.").
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specifically rejects "rights to payment for money or funds advanced or
sold. .. 191
The court in Custom Coals determined that the annuities policy was
not the same as an insurance policy and therefore found it to be a
general intangible.192 However, a Michigan court found an annuity to
be an insurance policy. 193 If a court were to find that an annuity is
indeed an insurance policy then it would fall under an "account"
under Revised 9-102 since the definition does cover the rights to pay-
ments of an insurance policy.
Payment streams from equipment leases where held by a court to
be chattel paper and not general intangibles t94 A creditor, who had
purchased the right to receive the lease payments, argued the pay-
ments made on the leases were general intangibles because they had
merely obtained the right to receive a payment and not the actual
equipment lease itself.195 The creditor characterized the "monetary
obligation" of chattel paper as a "general intangible. ' 196 The court,
using the new definitions of Revised Article 9 as well as prior case law
using former Article 9, refused to sever the right to receive payments
under a loan from the loan itself.197
A court rejected a creditor's argument that a cash construction
bond was property of the debtor's business. 198 The debtor was a con-
struction company who had given a town a cash bond.199 The court
determined that the cash bond was a general intangible and not the
personal property of the debtor's business.200 Since the creditor's fi-
nancing statement did not cover "general intangibles" but only the
property of the debtor and the proceeds from that property, it was
held that the creditor did not have a security interest in the cash
bond.201
191. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2)(vi) (2005). Article 9 defines "account" and specifically rejects
"rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold .... " Id.
192. In re Custom Coals Laurel, 258 B.R. 597, 601 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
193. See Wonsey v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 32 F.Supp.2d 939 (E.D. Mich. 1998). "Under
Michigan law, it appears that an annuity contract does come within the definition of a 'policy of
insurance.'" Id. at 942.
194. In re Commercial Money Ctr Inc., No. 02-09721-H7, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1080, at * 22
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2005).
195. Id. at *6.
196. Id. at *12.
197. Id. at *22.
198. In re Litchfield Constr, Mgmt., Inc., 137 B.R. 98, 100 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992).
199. Id. at 99.
200. Id. at 100.
201. Id.
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General intangibles are especially important in the area of intellec-
tual property. Cefrac was a corporation which entered into a licensing
agreement with the debtor.202 The debtor created a product which
was "heat resistant steel casting and fabrications including (without
limitation) products for use in heat treatment and reheat furnaces. '20 3
The debtor agreed to give Cefrac the "know-how" as to how to use
the product.20 4 The parties defined "know-how" in the licensing
agreement as "information of any kind relating to the design, con-
struction, manufacture, installation, sale and/or use of. . . [the] prod-
uct. ' 205 Cefrae argued that they were entitled to the proceeds from
the "know-how" agreement. The court determined the "know-how"
was a "general intangible" and that since the creditor did not take an
interest in "general intangibles" the security interest did not attach.206
Another case involved a debtor who owned and operated a phar-
macy.207 The debtor had executed a security agreement with a credi-
tor for "all of the Debtor's inventory, equipment, fixtures, name and
goodwill. '20 8 At issue were the proceeds that the debtor had received
from the sale of the customer lists of the pharmacy. 20 9 It was held that
the customer lists "are the very essence of 'goodwill"' since the vital-
ity of a pharmacy derives from the pharmacy's ability to refill prescrip-
tions and the customer lists are part of its goodwill.210
Proceeds of litigation are often overlooked by creditors when set-
ting forth a security interest. A financing statement of a creditor
stated that the creditor was taking an interest in "each and every ac-
count, receivable, contract right, lease, chattel paper and other rights
of the Debtor to the payment of money, of every nature, type and
description... 21 1 The court held the description to be too vague to
include the proceeds from litigation involving the debtor because a
subsequent creditor would not be put on notice that the creditor
would have an interest in the litigation proceeds.212
The revisions to Article 9 at least seem not to have effectuated any
real change in how a secured creditor is to describe intellectual prop-
202. In re SSE Int'l Corp., 198 B.R. 667, 668 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996).
203. Id. at 668.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 667-68.
206. Id. at 672.
207. In re Sojak Miller, Inc., 93 B.R. 768, 769 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 770.
211. In re Systems Eng'g & Energy Mgmt. Assoc, Inc., 284 B.R. 226, 230 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2002).
212. Id. at 234.
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erty of the debtor. As long as a creditor still uses the collateral term
of "general intangibles" it seems that the description will be held to be
valid as for trademarks, copyrights and litigation monies.
In addition Revised 9-102 has brought into the purview of "general
intangibles" the collateral of "software." Software is defined as "a
computer program and any supporting information provided in con-
nection with a transaction relating to the program. '213 What still has
yet to be determined is if debtor modifications to the core software
program, which are proprietary to the debtor, would be considered
under that definition or if it is solely the original unmodified computer
program that constitutes "software." In other words, the courts must
determine whether the identified collateral is so changed that the se-
curity interest in the "software" is destroyed because the parties never
intended the newly created "unique" software to be a part of the se-
cured collateral. A related question deals with the storage and pro-
duction of data within a computer program that is a security interest.
If a computer program is used as security for an obligation, the courts
may have to deal with the situation of how to sever the data stored
within the program from the program itself.
IX. CASES DECIDED SINCE 2001
Under Revised Article 9 there are no longer the categories of col-
lateral as there was under the former. Gone are "goods," "equip-
ment," "inventory," "farm products," and "general intangibles" which
were listed under the former Article 9 as "categories" of collateral.
Revised 9-108(b), while allowing a creditor to use the former catego-
ries of collateral, also allows a creditor to describe the collateral using
a specific listing of collateral or any other description which reasona-
bly allows identification of the collateral. 21 4 Presumably the "category
213. U.C.C. § 9-102 (a)(75) (2005). "'Software' means a computer program and any support-
ing information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program. The term
does not include a computer program that is included in the definition of goods." Id.
214. U.C.C. § 9-108(b) (2005). Section 9-108(b) provides examples of reasonable
identification:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a description of collateral reasonably
identifies the collateral if it identifies the collateral by:
(1) specific listing;
(2) category;
(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a type of collateral defined in [the
Uniform Commercial Code];
(4) quantity;
(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any other method, if the identity of
the collateral is objectively determinable.
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of collateral" referred to in Revised 9-108(b)(2) are the old categories
of collateral under former 9-109. Although a category isn't required
and a specific listing of the collateral is sufficient, it is necessary for a
creditor to use descriptions which can "reasonably identify the collat-
eral" in the security agreement. 215 A creditor's financing statement
only has to put subsequent creditors on notice that a potential security
interest may lie in some collateral of the debtor.216 Therefore, a fi-
nancing statement can take an interest in "all assets or personal prop-
erty of the debtor" and still be sufficient. 217 This is a change from the
former Article 9 which required a description which was more specific
than Revised Article 9 requires.
The question that follows is whether creditors will start using the
language "all assets of the debtor's" in their financing statements and
whether the courts will uphold such language. Admittedly there is not
much case law interpreting such language. One can only assume a
general reluctance by creditors to use such broad language in its fi-
nancing statements because of the unknown consequences of doing
so. Creditors may not wish to go into the court system to determine if
its description of the collateral which would be insufficient under the
former Article 9, is sufficient under the Revised Article 9.
The new cases that have been decided under the Revised Article 9
do indicate that the "categories" of collateral are just as important
now under Revised Article 9 as they were under the former Article 9.
Even though Interbusiness Bank v. First National Bank of Mifflintown
was decided in 2004, the court still used the former Article 9.218 The
defendant argued that the plaintiff did not have a valid security inter-
est in the "inventory" and "account receivables" of the debtor be-
cause its description of the security only included "goods" and
"accounts. '219 The court held that since "inventory" is a subcategory
of "goods" the plaintiff did have a security interest in the inventory of
the debtor.220 Furthermore the court determined that "accounts" did
refer to general commercial accounts receivable which was part of the
plaintiff's security interest.221 Although the court did use the former
Article 9 to reach its conclusions, the court pointed out that it was
Id.
215. U.C.C. § 9-108(a) (2005).
216. See id. § 9-502 cmt. 2
217. Id. § 9-504(2).
218. 318 F.Supp.2d 230, 241 (M.D. Pa. 2004).
219. Id. at 233.
220. Id. at 244.
221. Id.
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likely that even if Revised Article 9 was applicable, the outcome still
would have been the same for the same reasoning. 222
Another example of the courts still using the categories of collateral
can be found in In re Wiersma.223 The debtors in that case were dairy
farmers who filed for bankruptcy. 22 4 Litigation arose against an elec-
trical company who did faulty work at the dairy farm which caused the
debtor's dairy cows to suffer electrical shocks.225 After a settlement
had been reached, creditors of the debtors claimed an interest in the
proceeds of the litigation.22 6 The court held that a creditor's financing
statement which gave a security interest in "general intangibles" did
give that creditor an interest in the settlement proceeds. 227 The court
determined that the settlement proceeds were a "thing in action"
which fell under the category of "general intangibles. '2 28
However the Supreme Court of Idaho held in Karle v. Visser that
the right to collect on a promissory note could be categorized as both
"proceeds" as well as "general intangibles. 2 2 9 In this case, litigation
arose between the parties over the sale of a business. 230 The defen-
dant gave to a third party creditor an interest in "any judgments re-
sulting from the collection of the Note... no matter who hands those
proceeds from the sale or transfer of the collateral ... ,.231 The plain-
tiff argued that since the security agreement failed to list "general in-
tangibles" the security interest was invalid.232 Under former Article 9,
the Supreme Court of Washington had also held that "proceeds" and
"general intangibles" were not two mutually exclusive categories of
collateral. 233
In re Chorney also dealt with the collateral of settlement proceeds;
however, the court used former Article 9 in reaching its decision. 234
The settlement proceeds were paid out of an annuity, which the pay-
ing insurance company had arranged for.235 The payments were made
222. Id. at 244 n.12.
223. 283 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002) (discussing whether a debtor's insurance settlement
is a general intangible and subject to a creditor's security agreement).
224. Id. at 296.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 298.
227. Id. at 303.
228. In re Wiersma, 283 B.R. at 303.
229. 118 P.3d 136, 140 (Idaho 2005).
230. Id. at 137.
231. Id. at 138.
232. Id.
233. Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Bachmann, 757 P.2d 979, 984 (Wash. 1988).
234. 277 B.R. 477, 486 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y, 2002) (noting that former Article 9 does not apply
to the proceeding).
235. Id. at 479.
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directly to the debtor even though the insurance company was the
payee. 236 The debtor had secured a loan using the settlement pro-
ceeds as collateral. 237 The insurance company argued that the creditor
did not have a properly perfected security interest because the settle-
ment agreement made the proceeds non-assignable. 238 Further, the
debtor argued that Article 9 did not apply "to a transfer of an interest
or a claim in or under any policy of insurance or contract for an
annuity." 239
The court found a perfected security interest in favor of the credi-
tor.240 The court held that while payments from an annuity were be-
ing made to the debtor, it was the insurance company who owned the
annuity, not the debtor.241 Therefore, the debtor was powerless to
transfer any interest of the annuity thus keeping the claim under the
scope of Article 9.242
A debtor had taken a security interest in one particular item of
equipment of the debtor's. 243 Even though the security agreement did
list that one item, the financing statement that the debtor filed de-
scribed the collateral as "all of debtor's equipment. '244 The debtor
argued that the financing statement insufficiently described the collat-
eral because there was only one piece of equipment to which the cred-
itor's security interest attached and not multiple pieces of
equipment.245 The financing statement was held not to be overbroad
and sufficiently placed other creditors on notice that there may be a
security interest in the equipment of the debtor.246
Even though there is no need to use categories of collateral under
Revised Article 9 there has to be some kind of description of the col-
lateral in order for a financing statement to be valid. 247 The creditor
in In re Lynch entered into a general business security agreement
which listed "all equipment, fixtures, inventory, documents relating to
inventory, general intangibles, accounts, contract rights ... " as its se-
curity interest.248 However, when the creditor filed a financing state-
236. Id. at 481.
237. Id. at 479.
238. Id. at 480.
239. In re Chorney, 277 B.R. at 487.
240. Id. at 488.
241. Id. at 485.
242. Id.
243. In re Quality Press, Inc., 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1365, at *3 (Bankr. D. Utah 2004).
244. Id. at *8.
245. Id. at *22.
246. Id. at *30.
247. In re Lynch, 313 B.R. 798, 800 (Bankr. M.D. Wis. 2004).
248. Id. at 799.
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ment, there was no description of the collateral listed in the financing
statement.2 49 The financing statement merely described the collateral
as "general business security agreement ... now owned or hereafter
acquired. 250 The court held that the financing statement only gave
notice that there was a general business security agreement in exis-
tence not that there was a prior security interest.2 51 In order for the
financing statement to be valid, the court stated that the creditor had
to describe the collateral not just give notice.252
Another case which was determined under the Revised Article 9 is
In re Pickle Logging, Inc.2 53 The debtor had granted a security inter-
est in a piece of equipment known as a "skidder. 2 54 The creditor had
used the skidder's serial number in its security agreement and its fi-
nancing statement. 255 However the serial number that the creditor
used in its security agreement and its financing statement was
"DW648GX568154" when it was "DW548GX568154. '2 56 Even
though it was only a one-digit error, the court held that it was still
seriously misleading because there was no other description present
that would allow a third party to identify what the collateral was.257
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
kept the "seriously misleading" standard under the Revised Article 9.
Though a subjective standard, it provides the opportunity for a court
to balance interests and create justice without having to adhere to
rigid statutory requirements. One place where statutory requirements
have been strictly adhered to is the listing of a debtor's name in a
financing statement. Under the former Article 9 a debtor could be
listed by its trade name in a financing statement so long as it was not
seriously misleading. However, under Revised 9-503(c), mere use of a
trade name is not sufficient.
The debtor in In re Asheboro Precision Plastics, Inc. used its trade
name, Wade Technical Molding, to secure a loan from a creditor.258
The creditor's financing statement reflected the trade name and not
the legal name of the debtor which was "Asheboro Precision Plas-
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 801.
252. 313 B.R. at 801.
253. 286 B.R. 181 (Bankr. M.D. Ga 2002).
254. Id. at 182-83.
255. Id. at 183.
256. Id. at 183.
257. Id. at 184 (citing Yancy Bros. Co. v. Dehco, Inc., 134 S.E.2d 828, 830 (Ga. App. 1964))
(noting that if the serial number is inaccurate, there must be additional information that provides
a "key" to the collateral's identity).
258. 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 1091, at *4 ( M.D. N.C. Mar. 1, 2005).
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tics. ' 259 The court found the financing statement to be ineffective be-
cause the name was seriously misleading.260 A search by a subsequent
creditor under the legal name would not have revealed the security
interest of the creditor. 261
If a subsequent creditor would have been precluded from finding
the prior security interest based upon the name given in the financing
statement then, former Article 9 stated and Revised Article 9 states, a
financing statement is misleading. However, courts are holding that
Revised Article 9 requires much more accuracy in financing state-
ments. 262 In addition to excluding trade names, creditors will have to
use the legal name of the debtor, not a nickname. The creditor in In
re Kinderknect used a nickname of the debtor, Terry, and not his legal
name, Terrance, in its financing statement. 263 The financing statement
was deemed seriously misleading and ineffective by the court, which
wanted to clearly set forth what was required in a financing
statement.
264
This rationale was extended in Pankratz Implement Company v. Cit-
izens National Bank where the court held a financing statement inef-
fective based upon the debtor's name as it appeared in the financing
statement.265 The creditor used the name "Roger" instead of the
creditor's correct name, "Rodger," in its filing.266 Using the same line
of reasoning employed by the court in Kinderknect, the financing
statement was found to be seriously misleading since a subsequent
creditor would not have found the prior security interest using the
standard search logic as required by the state. 267
Agricultural liens are now treated differently than they were under
former Article 9. The plaintiffs in Dean v. Hall leased agricultural
land to the defendants.268 The defendants took a loan and pledged all
crops for the 2002 year in order to help finance the farming operations
of the land.269 Once the defendants failed to pay rent, the plaintiffs
sought to seize and sell the defendant's crops to satisfy the rent
owed.270 The court held that the plaintiffs did not have a landlord lien
259. Id. at *5.
260. Id. at *25.
261. Id.
262. In re Summitt Staffing, 305 Bankr. 347, 353 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
263. 308 Bankr. 71, 76 (10th Cir. 2004).
264. Id.
265. 102 P.3d 1165, 1168 (Ks. App. 2004).
266. Id. at 1166.
267. Id. at 1168.
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but an agricultural lien which was protected by Article 9.271 Under
the former Article 9 a party did not have to file in order to perfect an
agricultural lien, however, Revised 9-310 requires filing for perfec-
tion.272 Since the creditor in this case had filed a financing statement
it was the creditor who had the perfected security interest in the de-
fendant's crops.273
The case that gives the best insight into how cases are to be decided
under Revised Article 9 is In re Grabowski.274 The debtor-farmers
had granted a security interest in three pieces of their farm equipment
to two different creditors. 275 The financing statement of the first cred-
itor did not give the address of the farm but rather the address of the
debtor's business. 276 The collateral included "all inventory, chattel pa-
per, accounts, equipment and general intangibles. ' 277 The subsequent
creditor's financing statement specifically listed the pieces of farming
equipment at issue. 278 The issue before the court was whether a pru-
dent creditor searching the records would be put on notice that the
farm equipment of the debtors was encumbered by a security interest
of the first creditor.279 The court held that the financing statement of
the first creditor, while general, was enough to notify subsequent cred-
itors that an interest in the farm equipment was held by the first credi-
tor. 280 The description of the collateral was found to be consistent
with the new requirements of Revised Article 9 and since it did refer-
ence categories of collateral, it fulfilled the "notice" requirement of
Revised 9-108.281
X. CONCLUSION
One of the most notable changes made to Article 9 was the exclu-
sion of former section 9-402 that required creditors to describe the
types of collateral which was subject to a security interest. Creditors
could either state the specific item or items of collateral or they could
use the general categories of "consumer goods", "equipment", "farm
products" and "inventory." Instead, financing statements will upheld
271. Id. at *3.
272. Id.
273. Hall, No. 3:02CV728, 2003 WL 21650145, at *3.
274. 277 B.R. 388 (Bankr. S.D. Il. 2002).
275. Id. at 389.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 390 n. 4.
279. 277 B.R. at 390.
280. Id. at 392.
281. Id.
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by the courts if the creditor covers all assets of the debtor. Under
Revised Article 9 there is no equivalent of former 9-109 which defined
the classes of goods. However, Revised 9-102 still kept the types of
collateral which were defined under "goods" and clarifies what does
not fall under "goods." With the passage of Revised Article 9 came
new definitions of "goods," "accounts," and "general intangibles" al-
though creditors have not taken to describing the collateral any differ-
ently under Revised Article 9. Current case law establishes that
despite the leeway that creditors are going to be given when generally
describing its interest, the categories of collateral are still being used
in financing statements. Ultimately, the classification of collateral has
proven so far to be just as important under Revised Article 9 as it was
under the former Article 9.
What has yet to be determined is the use of the new rules that al-
lows creditors to take a security interest in all assets of the debtor in a
financing statement. Although a security agreement would have to be
more specific, a financing statement will be effective if the creditor's
security interest covered everything belonging to the debtor. Subse-
quent creditors will have to become more diligent researching prior
security interests, if they have not become so already. No case has yet
to be brought using the language of 9-502 and it remains to be seen if
creditors will use broad language such as what is suggested.
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